Abstract: For the purposes of information security and privacy between readers and tags, identity authentication is a significant issue for radio frequency identification (RFID) systems. In this study, the authors propose a novel security group-based key array authentication protocol, which is suitable for a large scale RFID environment. Based on a key array, this protocol can generate an authentication key for each pair of reader and tag with lower storage. Adding an identifier update phase, they design the authentication process passing the formal analysis from GNY. The security and performance analysis results show that the protocol they present can achieve better security than previous protocols in resisting external and internal attacks, with lower storage and acceptable communication and computation load.
Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems is a contactless automatic identification system that provide contact-free communication between a reader and a tag over a radio link. Recently, the wide deployment of RFID systems in a variety of applications has raised many concerns about security and privacy. RFID systems must ensure the security of communication data as well as solve the identity authentication issue among entities.
To resolve the security issue successfully, several authentication protocols have been proposed, most of which focus on the threats from the external illegal attackers, but ignore the attacks from the internal legal entities. Hash chain protocol [1] , which uses two different hash functions to confirm identity, can be used to achieve increased security. challenge-respond based RFID authentication protocol (HIDVP) [2] keeps track of its session number and is designed to prevent eavesdropping and replay attacks by diversifying values. Moessner and Gul [3] offered a high level of security through the combination of a random key scheme with a strong cryptography. Zhou et al. [4] proposed a lightweight anti-desynchronisation privacy preserving authentication protocol which is suitable for the low-cost environment. However, all the previous papers [1] [2] [3] [4] do not consider the internal attacks. The method suggested by Karthikeyan and Nesterenko [5] , based on simple exclusive-or (XOR) operation and matrix operation, cannot resist the external attacks. It does not support the authentication of multiple readers. Another method, used by Yang et al. [6] , in which tags only have hash function and exclusive-or operation, can improve the abilities of the forgery and anonymity attacks. However, it was pointed out that the scheme cannot protect privacy. Chien and Chen [7] proposed a mutual authentication scheme appropriate for low cost tags, but it cannot resist denial of service (DoS) attacks if the synchronisation between the tag and reader is lost. Kolias et al. [8] improved the protocol [7] by enabling readers and tags to communicate securely and by providing resistance against DoS attack. Ding et al. [9] proposed a method which shares a key from key array to resolve the internal attacks issue, but they do not provide a proof for correctness. Key array authentication protocol (KAAP) [10] is an extension to the protocol [9] , performing informal security analysis, but it cannot solve the internal attack in the same group of readers or tags, and does not include an update operation.
In this paper, we propose a novel security authentication protocol GKAAP (group-based KAAP), which is suitable for large scale RFID systems. It has the best capacity to authenticate communication. To deal with the internal attacks, we design an authentication key generation method using a key array based on [11] , which differs from the ones proposed in [9] [10] . Using this method, we define the authentication process to prevent both the external and internal attacks. Then, to increase the ability to protect against attacks, the pseudorandom identifier update method is used. Considering the correctness of our protocol, we use GNY logic [12] to carry out the formal analysis. The security and performance analysis results show that the protocol we present outperforms previous protocols in security with lower storage and acceptable communication and computation load, while also resisting various attacks such as forgery, replaying, tracking, DoS and internal attacks stemming from both the same group and between different groups.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We describe our proposed protocol in Section 2. Section 3 analyses formally the correctness of our protocol with GNY logic. Section 4 analyses the performance of our protocol. Finally, our concluding remarks are stated in Section 5.
Proposed GKAAP protocol
In order to resolve such security and privacy problems from both the external and internal attacks, especially in the same group, the GKAAP protocol is proposed. It is an extension to the protocol KAAP [10] which has a key in the same group to resist the attacks among groups.
In our protocol, two types of keys are used for encryption: the shared key and the authentication key. A unique shared key k u is given to legal readers and tags preventing external attacks. A key array D composed of authentication keys in the DB is used in security authentication between internal tags and readers.
Generation of the authentication key based on group
Suppose that tags are expressed as T i , i ∈ 0, 1, 2, …, m and the readers are expressed as R j , j ∈ 0, 1, 2, …, n. Then we define D as the key generation array, A as the generation array of tags with size m × n and G as the generation array of readers with size n × n. Suppose that D = A × G, where the dimension of array D is m × n. The expressions of A, G and D are
T i stores the ith row in A and R j stores the jth column in G. The authentication key is k ij in D. As the generation of rows in A is regular, T i can only store a i , which can decrease the storage space greatly. It is the same as R j which stores g j . D in database DB is used to prove the correctness of the authentication key by computing between T i and R j . If some tags and readers are not permitted to communicate, the corresponding key in D is null. The generation of the authentication key between T i and R j is described by the following equation
Based on the different functions, all tags and readers are divided into S and T groups, respectively, in which T i belongs to the sth tag group A s , s ∈ 1, 2, …, S and R j belongs to the tth read group G t , t ∈ 1, 2, …, T. Different read groups own relative independent authorities for each tag groups, using different authentication key array D st in DB. If one of the reader groups is not permitted to access a tag group, the corresponding key array is non-existent in DB, so the authentication cannot be carried out. Overall, the different tags in the same group have different authentication keys with the different readers in the same group, which can defend against the internal attacks in groups. By group classification, it is fit for multiple applications against unauthorised access. The authentication key must be computed with the corresponding a and g stored in the tag and reader, which can prevent losing keys if an attacker captures a tag and obtains all of its sensitive message, including the authentication key.
Group-based key array authentication protocol
In the initialisation of GKAAP, it will allot an ID to each tag and reader in order to make communication between the two more convenient. The true ID can be utilised by replay and tracking attacks, so we use pseudorandom identifier preID = CRC(ID) to substitute it.
In order to describe the authentication phases between a tag and a reader, we use T i and R j to illustrate the process of message exchanges. They are as follows:
1. Phase 1: R j generates a random number r R j , then concatenates r R j , preID R j , G t and g j to form r R j preID R j G t g j . Encrypting using the shared key k u , R j sends the message {r R j preID R j G t g j } k u to T i as an initial query.
Phase 2:
On receiving the query, T i decrypts the ciphertext {r R j preID R j G t g j } k u using k u . When T i obtains r R j , preID R j , G t and g j , it will do several jobs as follows: † T i verifies R j by checking G t in the list of permitted access reader groups which is prestored in its memory. If it is valid, T i will compute the authentication key k ij . Otherwise, it will stop the authentication process with an error code. † T i uses a i belonging to the tag group A s and g j to compute the authentication key k ij with formula (1). † T i generates a random number r T i , and encrypts r T i r R j by k ij to obtain {r T i r R j } k ij . Then, T i concatenates preID T i , A s and r T i r R j } k ij to encrypt by k u .
T i sends the message preID T i A s r T i r R j k ij k u to R j as an response.
3. Phase 3: When R j receives the response, it extracts preID T i and A s from preID T i A s r T i r R j k ij k u with k u . Then, R j forwards preID T i ||A s to DB for verifying the identity of T i and obtains k ij . 4. Phase 4: When receiving preID T i ||A s , DB first extracts preID T i to verify whether the message was generated from a legal tag of the corresponding A s . If preID T i is correct, DB will deliver the corresponding authentication key k ij to R j from the key array D st . When R j receives k ij , it will check whether the current computed r R j equals the previous generated r R j in Phase 1. If the two values are identical, T i will be successfully authenticated by R j . Otherwise, it will stop the authentication process with an error code. Phase 5: Reversing r T i , we obtain r T i . R j encrypts r T i by k ij and forwards the ciphertext r T i k ij to T i . To avoid being intercepted directly by attackers from the latter part of {r T i r R j } k ij which will be used for spoofing, it chooses r T i to transmit. When receiving {r T i } k ij , T i extracts r T i by decrypting and reversing. T i checks whether the current computed r T i equals the previous generated r T i in Phase 2. If the two values are identical, R j will be successfully authenticated by T i . Otherwise, it will stop the authentication process with an error code.
The authentication process is illustrated in Fig. 1 , and the phases can be described as follows
Updating for pseudorandom identifier
Using the same preID to replace a same tag ID or a same reader ID for long time is unsafe for RFID systems. Tags and readers can easily suffer from replay, tracking and forgery attacks. We will update preID for every tag and reader when they authenticate with each other. To maintain consistency, DB will store the new preID and the old preID for a tag or a reader simultaneously, which can prevent the DoS attack from not updating the preID simultaneously between a tag (reader) and DB. If an error occurred during updating the preID to a tag or a reader, DB will use the old preID to attend the authentication process. The generation of the new preID of a tag is described by (2) , and the generation of the new preID of a reader is described by the following equation
PRNG is a unidirectional random number generator, which is irreversible. DB stores preID T i (new) , preID T i , preID R j (new) and preID R j simultaneously.
The new preID can be transmitted and verified during Phases 4 and 5. The authentication process of updating is described as follows † Phase 4: DB will compute the preID T i (new) and preID R j (new) . It will concatenate the corresponding authentication key k ij , preID T i (new) and preID R j (new) . Then, DB will deliver preID T i (new) preID R j (new) k ij to R j . R j extracts and checks preID R j (new) to decide whether the preID R j should be updated. If preID R j (new) com W PRNG preID R j , R j will update its preID. † Phase 5: R j encrypts r T i ⊕ preID T i (new) by k ij and forwards
decryption and checks the correctness of the r T i and its new
R j will be successfully authenticated by T i . Otherwise, it will stop the authentication process with an error code. T i will then update its preID by formula (2). DB, readers and tags store the same PRNG function.
The authentication processes 4 and 5 are illustrated in Fig. 2 , and the Phases 4 and 5 can be described as follows 
3 Formal analysis of authentication protocol with GNY logic
In this section, GNY logic is applied to analyse the design correctness of GKAAP. We will analyse our protocol using four steps: proposing the initial assumptions, setting up an ideal model, confirming the security goals and verifying by GNY logic rules [12] . Table 1 shows notations to facilitate the formal descriptions.
Initial assumptions
We assume that the following holds at the beginning of every run of the protocol.
The assumptions for
These expressions indicate that: T i possesses r T i , preID T i , A s , k u and k ij ; T i believes that k u and k ij are fresh and T i is entitled to believe that preID R j is fresh; T i believes k u and k ij are suitable secrets for T i and R j ; T i believes k ij is a suitable secret for T i and DB.
These expressions indicate that: R j possesses r R j , preID R j , G t , g j and k u ; R j believes that k u is fresh and R j is entitled to believe that preID T i is fresh; R j believes that k u and k ij are suitable secrets for T i and R j .
The assumptions for DB
These expressions indicate that: DB possesses k ij ; DB believes that A s and k ij are fresh, and DB is entitled to believe that preID T i is fresh; DB believes that k ij is a suitable secret for DB and T i .
Ideal model
According to the authentication phases, the formal messages delivered between T i R j , and DB can be expressed as follows Table 1 Symbol notations Notation Description P ⊳ X P receives a message containing X, P can read and repeat X P ⊳ * X P receives X, X is a not-originated-here formula X ∈ P P possesses, or is capable of possessing X P| ∼ X P once conveyed X P|≡#X P believes, or is entitled to believe that X is fresh P|≡φX P believes, or is entitled to believe that X is recognisable P|≡C P believes, or would be entitled to believe, that statement C holds P| ⇒ C P is an authority on statement C, and has jurisdiction over C P | ; P 
Security goals
The security goals for T i , R j and DB can be expressed as follows
, A s ; R j believes the authentication key k ij between DB and T i ; R j believes that
DB believes that T i conveyed preID T i .
Verification
The security goals can be verified by the initial assumptions and GNY logic rules in the ideal model. The process is similar to the protocol [10] .
1. For C(1): T i | ; R j | r R j From B(1), it has T i ⊳ * {r R j } k u . Applying rule T1: (P ⊳ ( * X ))/(P ⊳ X ), we obtain T i ⊳ {r R j } k u . From the assumptions for T i , it has k u ∈ T i . Applying rule T3: (P ⊳ {X } K , K [ P)/(P ⊳ X ), we obtain T i ⊳ r R j . Then, applying rule P1: (P ⊳ X )/(X [ P), we obtain r R j [ T i . Applying rule P3: (X ∈ P)/(H(X ) ∈ P) and R6: (H(X ) ∈ P)/ (P| ≡ φ(X )), we obtain T i | ; f(r R j ). Thus, T i is entitled to believe that r R j is recognisable. Applying the assumption T i | ; k u and rule F1:
. As a consequence, T i believes that preID R j k u is fresh.
3. For C(2): R j |; DB ↔ k ij T i From the assumptions for DB, it has DB|; DB ↔ k ij T i and the communication channel between R j and DB is secure, so R j | ≡ DB. Applying rule J1:(P| ≡ Q| ⇒ C, P| ≡ Q| ≡ C)/(P| =C ), we obtain R j |; DB ↔ k ij T i . As a consequence, R j believes that k ij used in DB and T i is credible.
The remainder of the security goals can be verified based on the above corresponding processes. GKKAP protocol uses a key array based on group to set up authentication key, which is different from [9, 10] . It also has a different authentication process and an update method, but the formal analysis results are similar to the protocol [10] . Thus, our protocol has the correctness and security performance based on this formal analysis.
Evaluation

Security analysis
The presented authentication approach offers a high resistance to most common attacks relating to RFID systems. We analyse its security as follows:
1. Forgery attack resistance: The forgery attack is an attacker disguised as a reader or a tag which tries to obtain valid responses to cheat the legal entities. Our protocol can resist the forgery attack. The solution can be discussed by two cases.
† Forge T i : The attacker does not have the right a i and preID T i , so it cannot compute a correct k ij , thereby failing to be authenticated by DB. † Forge R j : The attacker does not have a correct G t that belongs to the permissible group list of T i , so it cannot pass the authentication of T i . The incorrect g j cannot compute a correct k ij , thereby failing to be authenticated by DB. 2. Replay attack resistance: Replay attack means that an attacker impersonates a reader or a tag by replaying the previous query or response, in order to complete the authentication process. The random number generated by readers and tags can resolve the problem, because the random number is different in every transmission. We will compare the received and original random numbers to see whether they are the same or not. If they are same, the authentication is successful. In Phase 4, the reader verifies the random number directly, and in Phase 5, the reader chooses r T i to transmit, which can protect against replay attack by intercepting directly from the latter part of {r T i r R j } k ij . The tag must reverse the received random number to verify. 3. Tracking attack resistance: Multiple malicious readers in fixed locations transmit the same query to a tag. If the tags response remains invariant in all transmissions, the reader may track the tag passing by. The response of a tag to the same query must be changed. So the following measures can be employed to solve the above problem.
† There are variable random numbers at different time.
† The true ID of tags can be substituted by preID, and the preID must be updated after every authentication process. 4. DoS attack resistance: Owing to the blocking and proofing attack, the updating message cannot reach the tag, so the updating of preID is prevented. The following authentication cannot be carried out smoothly. DB stores the new preID and the old preID simultaneously. If the tag does not receive the updating message, it will use the old one which can still pass the verification of DB.
Internal attack resistance:
The protocol from [10] can prevent internal attack from different groups of readers or tags. Readers and tags of the internal system impersonate another reader and tag from other groups, which can be discovered by DB quickly, because different groups use different k ij . This method can resolve internal attack between groups, but it cannot solve the internal attack in groups, which can be solved by having a different k ij for each reader and tag in the same group. Each tag and reader has a different authentication key in our protocol, so our protocol can resist internal attack, not only among the different groups but also within the same group. 6. Mutual authentication: Our protocol provides mutual authentication between the communicating entities. The preID R j of reader and r T i are authenticated by the tag in Phases 1 and 5. The preID T i of tag, r R j and k i,j are authenticated by the reader with the aid of DB in Phases 3 and 4. The shared key k u is mainly used to provide the confidential authentication to protect against the external attacks. Table 2 summarises and compares the security analysis of various recent protocols as well as our novel protocol presented in this paper. It can be concluded that the proposed protocol provides a much higher level of security than the previous presented protocols. The compared protocols are typical and interrelated with GKAAP. It can resist both the external and internal attacks effectively.
Performance analysis
During the performance analysis, the length of keys and random numbers are ignored for the sake of simplicity. In our protocol, the access list of tag includes the reader group ID, the number of which is T. The tag does not store the authentication key, but only a i , the number of which is also T. Then, the tag must store its identifier, the length of which is L. The storage of a tag is 2T + L. The value T is lower than L which is also defined as the length of the access list in KAAP. The communication load and computation load is similar to the protocol presented in paper [10] , but the delivery message increase L to update from a reader to a tag. A reader connects with DB directly, so its ability to transmit additional data are very strong. Adding the updating part, tags and readers must carry out random number operation (PRNG) to update preID in our protocol, so the computation load is 2(R + E). We compare performance between GKAAP and KAAP because KAAP [10] is most closely related to our protocol. Table 3 shows the performance comparison between KAAP and our protocol. From it, we can see that our protocol has lower storage requirements, and slightly higher communication load and computation load. PRNG has less cost, so computation load is acceptable. Hence, GKAAP can be used in the applications requiring high security with proper cost. Thus, the generation method of authentication key by key array in our protocol did not increase tag consumption, but unexpectedly reduced the consumption.
Conclusions
We describe a novel security authentication protocol GAKKP, which is suitable for large scale RFID systems. To strengthen the resistance to internal attack in groups, we propose a method to generate authentication key by key array, which can reduce storage of tags effectively. During the course of identity authentication, we introduce the identifier updating phase, which can enhance the performance to prevent external attacks. From GNY analysis, the design correctness of our protocol is proved. The security and performance analysis results show that the protocol we present can achieve better security than previous protocols with proper cost. Based on the comprehensive analysis and comparison, our protocol can be used in applications requiring high security. N, the protocol does not have ability to resist the attacks; Y, the protocol has ability to resist the attacks; Δ, the protocol has partially ability to resist the attacks 
